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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R. COOK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC., a
Utah corporation; MONTMORENCY
HAYES AND TALBOT ARCHITECTS,
INC., a Utah corporation; MHT
ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah
corporation; HALVERSON
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.,
Defendants.

Case No. 860511

MONTMORENCY HAYES AND TALBOT
ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
VAN BOERUM & FRANK ASSOCIATES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Does the

Plaintiff's claim for negligence present

any genuine issue of fact?
B.

Do the undisputed facts

own negligence as a matter of law?
1

establish the Plaintiff's

C.

If Plaintiff

Plaintiff's

is negligent

negligence

the

sole

as a matter of law, is

proximate

cause

of his

injuries as a matter of law?

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November

21, 1981, the Plaintiff, Dennis Cook,

was employed as an assistant manager in the Sears Automotive
Center in Ogden, Utah.

The Defendant Christiansen Brothers,

Inc. was the general contractor who
tive center

constructed the automo-

earlier in 1981, and the Defendants Montmorency

Hayes and Talbot Architects were the architects who designed
the building that Christiansen Brothers built.
During the

course of the day, Plaintiff went to a

drinking fountain near the middle of

the north

wall in the

automotive center. While he was getting a drink, one of the
men in the shop said something to the Plaintiff and, when he
turned

around,

he

lost

his

footing and fell hitting the

fountain which his neck and falling

to the

tiff's

7.)

Deposition, pp

5,

6

and

floor.

(Plain-

Plaintiff suffered

serious injuries.
Plaintiff
negligent in

alleges

that

the

for the

dumping of

Plaintiff alleges that oil from the
in that

were

the design, construction and placement of the

drinking fountain about 18 inches away
drain designed

Defendants

the presence

of the
2

from a

12 x

12 oil

excess oil in the shop.
drain caused

his fall,

oil was due to the negligence

design and placement of the drinking fountain and

oil drain

next to each other in the shop.
The Defendants' move for
basis that Plaintiff's

own

Summary Judgment on the

negligence

were

cause of his injuries as a matter of law.

the proximate

Plaintiff appeals

from the order granting summary judgment.

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issues of proximate
factual issues
for summary
evidence

and are

judgment

of

a

cause

a

negligence

case are

inappropriately decided in a motion

unless

causal

in

(1)

there

is

absolutely no

connection

between the defendant's

negligence and plaintiff's injuries

or (2) plaintiff's own

negligence is superceding and is the sole proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
the facts present disputed issues both as to Plaintiff's own
negligence and as to
Defendants'

the

negligence

contribution

in

causing

and

extent

Plaintiff's

Because of these factual issues, the case should
trial

and

the

trial

Court's

reversed.

3

of the

injuries.
proceed to

Motion for Summary Judgment

IV.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE DETERMINATION OF "PROXIMATE
CAUSE" IN A
NEGLIGENCE ACTION IS NORMALLY A FACTUAL DETERMINATION.
The

issue

of

proximate

cause

is

ordinarily a

factual matter to be reserved for the trier of fact.
v Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981); Jensen v Dolen,

Waters
12 Utah

2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962).
Two exceptions have been recognized to the general
rule that the issue of proximate

cause may

not be resolved

by summary judgment:
1)

If no

connection between
tiff's injuries,

the

evidence exists

defendant's

as to the causal

negligence

and plain-

summary judgment may be granted.

Mitchell

v Pearson Enterprise, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
2)

If

plaintiff's

own

negligence

is

undisputed, and

plaintiff's own

actions are an independent

and intervening

cause,

judgment

summary

may

be granted.

Cooke v Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981).
The Mitchell

and Cooke

exceptions, as applied to

the Plaintiff's case, are discussed below.
In an appellate review of a
facts are
party.

viewed in

summary judgment, the

the light most favorable to the losing

Mitchell, supra.

4

POINT II: DISPUTED FACTS EXIST WHICH MIGHT1 SHOW A CAUSAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN fTHE DEFENDANTS ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF S INJURIES.
The Defendants asserted the
in

support

of

their

Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing

that no evidence exists of a
Defendants1

alleged

Mitchell case, supra,

causal connection

negligent

between the

design and placement of the

drinking fountain and Plaintiff's fall.
In Mitchell, the Plaintiff's
edly

killed

as

a

proximate

result

decedent was allegof

negligent

hotel

security in the Hilton Hotel in which he was a guest when he
was shot and killed by an unknown assailant in his room.

In

a lengthy opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, the Utah Supreme Court found "no direct evidence
liking Mitchell's death with the alleged inadequate security
measures" at the hotel, and "no direct evidence of any kind"
to how Mitchell met his
into Mitchell's

assailant, how

room, and

the

what prior relationship, if any,

Mitchell and the assailant might have had.
at page

246.

Since no

assailant got

Mitchell, supra

causal evidence existed, trial was

unnecessary.
Here, the nature and
were before
design and
disputed.

the court.

causes

of

Plaintiff's fall

The roles of the Defendants in the

construction of

the automotive

center were not

Neither was the Defendants' alleged negligence in

placing the drinking fountain next to the oil drain disputed
for purposes of the motion.
5

Because the Defendants produced

no affidavits or testimony
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit

"A")

in support

only the

and

of their

Motion for

Plaintiff's affidavit (addendum

Plaintiff's

published

deposition

were

before the court.
Therefore, these facts showing a causal connection
between the Defendants

alleged

negligence

and Plaintiff's

injuries were before the Court:
1)

The

installed by Defendants

drinking
was

fountain

being

used

designed

for

and

its intended

purpose by the Plaintiff when he was injured while getting a
drink.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p.7)
2)

fountain was

The

hole

next

the drinking

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 21)

3)

In the

in the

ordinary course

hole, employees

fountain and

of disposing of

would sometimes miss the

hole and spill waste oil onto the floor
the drinking

to

designed for the purpose of disposing of waste

oil from the shop.

waste oil

large

oil drain.

in the

vicinity of

(Plaintiff's Deposi-

tion, at 21)
4)
circle of

At the

time

oil approximately

on the floor around

the

oil

Plaintiff

was

injured, a

18 inches in circumference lay
drain

and

by

the fountain.

(Plaintiff's Deposition at 50).
5)

Plaintiff

slipped

turning the respond to another employee
getting a drink.

in

this

oil

while

while Plaintiff was

(Plaintiff's Deposition at 7, 31 and 32).
6

6)

Plaintiff will testify that his fall was

caused by the oil surrounding the drinking fountain.
7)
would not

Plaintiff will testify

have happened

that

the injury

but for the fact that the drinking

fountain and the oil drain were placed next to each other in
the design

and construction of the building.

(Affidavit of

Plaintiff Dennis R. Cook, paragraph 3 ) .
8)

Plaintiff

will

testify

that

improper

placement of the drinking fountain next to the oil drain was
the principal cause of his injury.

(Affidavit

of Plaintiff

Dennis R. Cook, see also Deposition of Plaintiff at 22).
The

foregoing

connection between the
drinking fountain

facts
placement

next to

and Plaintiff's fall.
the trier

all of

circumstances

injuries were
gence, this
summary

and

the oil

Although

required by
the

establish

of fact
then

judgment

causal
under

simple causal

installation

of the

drain by the Defendants

many

other

facts

will be

to determine whether, under
existing,

proximately caused
simple

a

the Plaintiff's

by the Defendants1 negli-

connection

is

enough

to deny

the rational outlined in Mitchell/

supra.
POINT III: THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFFfS OWN
STILL IN QUESTION.
The Defendants

relied in

the Trial

NEGLIGENCE IS
Court on the

Cooke case, supra, in support of their contention
plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.

7

that this

In Cooke,
dant's apartment*
open an

the plaintiff

Plaintiff

was tenant in the defen-

had

asked

the

out-of-reach window in the apartment which had been

painted shut during recent
allegedly agreed

to do

remodeling,

so.

and

the defendants

When the defendants failed to

unstick the window, the plaintiff constructed
two

two-by-four

can.

boards

When plaintiff

platform

and

footing, fell
himself.

began

hammering

through

The

placed

the

injured

defendant's motion

on

can

in

top of the

and

tenant

sued

unstick

the

tipped

over injuring

the owners for their
windows.

Upon the

for summary judgment the court concluded

actions "and

constructing

platform was

to the

the window, he lost his

that "the plaintiff's injuries were not
of defendants

a platform of

atop an overturned garbage

climbed barefooted

negligence in failing to

gence

defendants to

the sole

a forseeable result

that the plaintiff's own negli-

and

climbing

upon

the

unstable

proximate cause of plaintiff's fall.

The summary judgment was sustained on appeal, with the court
noting that

construction of the platform was an independent

and intervening cause for plaintiff's fall.

Cooke, supra at

page 676.
The

Defendants

facts in support

of

assert

their

the

contention

following undisputed
that

the Plaintiff

acted negligently as a matter of law:
1)

Plaintiff

was

the assistant manager of

the Sears Automotive Center (Deposition of
8

Plaintiff, p 3).

2)

The

lighting

in

the

auto

"pretty good" at the time of Plaintiff's fall.

center was
(Plaintiff's

Deposition, p 6 ) .
3)

Oil

was

usually

on the floor in other

places around the automotive

center.

(Plaintiff's Deposi-

tion, p 16).
4)

Plaintiff

soles of his shoes.

had

some

oil already on the

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p 7 ) .

While these facts may tend to show some negligence
on the
sive

part of
and

the Plaintiff himself, they are not conclu-

certainly

Plaintiff was

do

not

negligent as

support

about

injuries.

the

cause

finding

that the

a matter of law for purposes of

the Motion for Summary Judgment.
known

a

and

Much

more

needs

to be

foreseeability of Plaintiff's

For example, the following

questions need

to be

addressed by the trier of fact at trial:
1)

As

assistant

manager of the automotive

center, did Plaintiff have a duty to clean up the oil around
the drinking
such a duty.

fountain?
The

Defendants allege that he did have

truth

of

his

duties

is

disputed and

evidence of those duties was not before the court.
2)

Was

the

oil

automotive shop of a different
around

the

drinking

fountain?

before the court.

9

found

nature
No

elsewhere
than

the

in

the

oil found

evidence of this was

3)
fallen because
shop?

Had

of oil

the

Plaintiff

on the

or

floor in

other employees

other areas of the

This issue has not been addressed.
4)

differ

in

Did the oil around the drinking fountain

quantity

from

oil found elsewhere in the shop?

This issue has not been addressed.
5)
drinking fountain

Did the normal and expected uses
present a

oil surrounding it than
automotive shop?

of the

greater risk of falling in the

would

be

found

elsewhere

in the

This issue has not been addressed.

6)

If the

normal and

intended uses of the

drinking fountain presented any special hazard or risk

of a

fall, did the Plaintiff know or should he have known of this
special risk or hazard?
7)
drinking

fountain

other times?

This issue has not been addressed.

Was there more or
on

the

less

oil

around the

day of Plaintiff's fall than at

This issue has not been addressed.
8)

Did Plaintiff wear special shoes or take

other special precautions to reasonably prevent his slipping
in oil on the floor of the automotive shop?

This issue has

not been addressed.
9)

Did

Plaintiff

ordinary and reasonable care which would
employee

in

the

automotive

exercise

be expected

of an

shop while getting his drink?

This issue has not been addressed.

10

otherwise

These

and

other

issues

trier of fact after examination

must

of

all

be decided by the
relevant

facts at

trial before Plaintiff can be found negligent as a matter of
law.

POINT IV. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS AN INDEPENDENT AND
INTERVENING
CAUSE
SUFFICIENT TO RELIEVE THE
DEFENDANTS OF LIABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Even if the Plaintiff can be found negligent
matter

of

law,

the

Defendants

liability as a matter of law
gence was

an independent

injuries.

Cooke, supra.
If the

would be

not

unless the

was

be

relieved of

Plaintiff's negli-

and intervening

Plaintiff

the sole

may

as a

cause of his own

negligent, his negligence

legal cause, the superceding cause, only

if his negligence was independent of Defendant's negligence.
His negligence

was not independent if it was foreseeable by

the Defendants who

designed

fountain and oil drain.
P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

and

constructed

the drinking

See Godeski v Provo City Corp., 690
The

Defendants can

assert no facts

which might show that the Plaintiff's was using the drinking
fountain in any manner other than
and expected
to be used.
not be

manner.

It was being used as it was designed

Plaintiff's use of the

a superceding

entirely foreseeable.

its intended, foreseeable

drinking fountain could

and independent

cause because it was

Plaintiff has nothing
11

in common with

the plaintiff in Cooke, supra, who constructed a platform on
top of an overturned garbage can and fell off.
If the Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law,
such negligence

might also

Defendants of

be superceding

liability if,

in the

care, he should have seen the
have

perceived

should have

it

and relieve the

exercise of reasonable

oil on

the floor,

he should

as potentially dangerous situation, and

avoided

it.

Paving Co., 24 Utah

Anderson

v.

Parson Read-e-Mix

2nd 128, 467 P2d 45 (1970).

After all

of the circumstances surrounding his fall have been examined
by

the

trier

recovery from

of

fact, this

the

Defendants.

Judgment, however,
the

standard

Plaintiff,

of

the

the

care

rule
For

which

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's

general

should

these issues

purposes

have

reasonable

of Summary

cause

of
as

been

used the

perceptions of the

to avoid

exercise

decide the issue of proximate
Some of

be used to bar

court had insufficient evidence of

hazards, the Plaintiff's attempts
the

might

the hazard, and

reasonable
a

care to

matter

of law.

which remain unresolved are discussed

in Point II above as preventing Summary Judgment even on the
issue of Plaintiff's negligence.
A proper determination of the "proximate cause" of
Plaintiff's injuries will require a complete
all

of

the

factors

contributing

to

Plaintiff's own duties and actions, and
which of

all the

factors contributing
12

examination of

Plaintiff's

fall,

a

as to

decision

to Plaintiff's fall

should be the legal cause.

This

case

should

proceed to

trial for those determinations.

V.

CONCLUSION
The

Summary

Judgment

entered

inappropriate because of unresolved
ing the

by the Trial Court was
factual issues concern-

proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, and should

be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted

this

/^

day of January,

1986.
HELGESEN & WATERFALL

JA<
Attorney

SEN
Appellant
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Exhibit A:
Affidavit of Plaintiff Dennis R. Cook

Exhibit B:
Summary Judgment

JACK C. HELGESEN
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-1420
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R. COOK,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
PLAINTIFF
DENNIS R. COOK

vs.
CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC. a
Utah Corporation; MONTMORENCY
HAYES and TALBOT ARCHITECTS,
INC., a Utah Corporation;
MH and T ARCHITECTS, INC. a
Utah Corporation; HALVERSON
PLUMBING and HEATING,

Civil No. 94076

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
: ss.
)

I, Dennis R. Cook, hereby state under oath that:
1.

I am the Plaintiff in this action.

2.

On November

21, 1981,

I was

injured by a fall

while using a drinking fountain at Sears Automative center in
Ogden, Utah.
3.

The injury

would not

have happened but for the

fact that the drinking fountain and oil drain

were placed so

close to each other that an accident was inevitable.
4.

I

believe

the

poor

placement of the drinking

fountain next to the oil drain was the principal cause for my
injury.

DATED this

/ ?

rV<

day of August, 1986.

.y^tM^co

DENNIS R. COOK, Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND
August, 1986.

SWORN to before me this

'--iiw./|„ (J

\°\

day of

^.UJMS

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Ogden, Utah
My Commission Expires: 3/3/87
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RAYMOND M. BERRY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Christiansen
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R. COOK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation; MONTMOR-•
ENCY, HAYES & TALBOT ARCHITECTS , INC., a Utah corporation; MHT ARCHITECTS, INC.,
a Utah corporation; HALVERSON
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 94,076

MONTMORENCY, HAYES & TALBOT
ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
VAN BOERUM & FRANK ASSOCIATES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.
The motions of Defendants Christiansen Brothers, Inc.;
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc.; MHT Architects,
Inc. and Third Party Defendant Van Boerum & Frank Associates, Inc,

for summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing came on for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on Wednesday, August
20, 1986, Honorable David Roth, District Judge, presiding; Jack
C. Helgesen appearing for plaintiff, Raymond M. Berry appearing
for Christiansen Brothers, Inc., Richard K. Hincks appearing for
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. and MHT Architects,
Inc., Paul S. Felt appearing for Halverson Plumbing and Heating,
Craig R. Mariger appearing for Van Boerum & Frank Associates;
the deposition of Dennis R. Cook having been published, the
memoranda of counsel having been read, the arguments of counsel
having been heard and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, and it appearing that there is no genuine issue of fact,
NOW, THEREFORE:
1.

Judgment is entered in favor of each of the defendants

that plaintiff take nothing;
2.

The Third Party Complaint of Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot

Architects, Inc. is dismissed with prejudice;
3.

The Crossclaims of all of the parties against each other

are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of August, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID ROTH, District Judge

